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Abstract 
Abstraction-Carrying Code (ACC) has recently been proposed as a framework 
for mobile code safety in which the code supplier provides a program together with 
an abstraction whose validity entails compliance with a predefined safety policy. 
The abstraction plays thus the role of safety certifícate and its generation is carried 
out automatically by a fixed-point analyzer. The advantage of providing a (fixed-
point) abstraction to the code consumer is that its validity is checked in a single 
pass of an abstract interpretation-based checker. A main challenge is to reduce 
the size of certificates as much as possible while at the same time not increasing 
checking time. In this paper, we first introduce the notion of reduced certifícate 
which characterizes the subset of the abstraction which a checker needs in order to 
validate (and re-construct) the full certifícate in a single pass. Based on this notion, 
we then instrument a generic analysis algorithm with the necessary extensions in 
order to identify the information relevant to the checker. 
Key words: Reduced certificates, abstraction-carrying code, 
abstract interpretation, mobile code safety, logic programming 
1 Introduction 
Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [12] is a general framework for mobile code safety 
which proposes to associate safety information in the form of a certifícate 
to programs. The certifícate (or proof) is created at compile time by the 
certifier on the code supplier side, and it is packaged along with the code. 
The consumer which receives or downloads the (untrusted) code+certificate 
package can then run a checker which by an efncient inspection of the code 
and the certifícate can verify the validity of the certifícate and thus compliance 
with the safety policy. The key benefit of this approach is that the task of the 
consumer is reduced to checking, a procedure that should be much simpler, 
efficient, and automatic than generating the original certifícate. Abstraction-
Carrying Code (ACC) [3] has been recently proposed as an enabling technology 
for PCC in which an abstraction (or abstract model of the program) plays the 
role of certifícate. An important feature of ACC is that not only the checking, 
but also the generation of the abstraction is carried out automatically, by a 
fixed-point analyzer. Both the analysis and checking algorithms are always 
parametric on the abstract domain, with the resulting genericity. This allows 
proving a wide variety of properties by using the large set of abstract domains 
that are available, well understood, and with already developed proofs for 
the correctness of the corresponding abstract operations. This is one of the 
fundamental advantages of ACC. 
In this paper, we consider analyzers which construct a program analysis 
graph which is an abstraction of the (possibly infinite) set of states explored 
by the concrete execution. To capture the different graph traversal strate-
gies used in different fixed-point algorithms we use the generic description 
of [8], which generalizes the algorithms used in state-of-the-art analysis en-
gines. Essentially, the certification/analysis carried out by the supplier is an 
iterative process which repeatedly traverses the analysis graph until a fixpoint 
is reached. The analysis information inferred for each cali is stored in the 
answer table [8]. In the original ACC framework, the final full answer table 
constitutes the certifícate. Since this certifícate contains the fixpoint, a single 
pass over the analysis graph is suflicient to validate it on the consumer side. 
One of the main challenges for the practical uptake of ACC (and related 
methods) is to produce certificates which are reasonably small. This is impor-
tant since the certifícate is transmitted together with the untrusted code and, 
henee, reducing its size will presumably contribute to a smaller transmission 
time. Also, this reduces the storage cost for the certifícate. Nevertheless, a 
main concern when reducing the size of the certifícate is that checking time 
is not increased as a consequence. In principie, the consumer could use an 
analyzer for the purpose of generating the whole fixpoint from scratch, which 
is still feasible since analysis is automatic. However, this would defeat one of 
the main purposes of ACC, which is to reduce checking time. The objective of 
this paper is to characterize the subset of the abstraction which must be sent 
within a certifícate and which still guarantees a single pass checking process. 
In the PCC scheme, the basic idea in order to reduce a certifícate is to 
store only the analysis information which the checker is not able to reproduce 
by itself [9]. With this purpose, Necula and Lee [13] designed a variant of the 
Edinburgh Logical Framework, called LF¿, in which certificates discard all the 
information that is redundant or that can be easily synthesized. Also, Oracle-
based PCC [14] aims at minimizing the size of certificates by providing the 
checker with the minimal information it requires to perform a proof. Tactic-
based PCC [4] aims at minimizing the size of certificates by relying on large 
reasoning steps, or tactics, that are understood by the checker. Finally, this 
general idea has also been deployed in lightweight bytecode verification [16] 
where the certifícate, rather than being the whole set of Frame Types (FT) 
associated to each program point is reduced by omitting those (local) program 
point FTs which correspond to instructions without branching and which are 
lesser than the final FT (fixpoint). Our proposal for ACC is at the same time 
more general (because of the parametricity of the ACC approach) and carries 
the reduction further because it includes only in the certifícate those calis in 
the analysis graph (including both branching an non branching instructions) 
required by the checker to re-generate the certifícate in one pass. 
2 Generation of Full Certificates in ACC 
This section introduces the notion of full certifícate in the context of (C)LP 
[3]. We assume the reader is familiar with abstract interpretation (see [6]) 
and (Constraint) Logic Programming (C)LP (see, e.g., [11] and [10]). We 
consider an abstract domain (Da, EL) and its corresponding concrete domain 
(2"°, C), both with a complete lattice structure. Abstract valúes and sets of 
concrete valúes are related by an abstraction function a : 2D —• Da, and a 
concretization function 7 : Da —• 2D. An abstract valué y G Da is a safe 
approximation of a concrete valué x G D iff x G 7(2/). The concrete and 
abstract domains must be related in such a way that the following holds [6] 
Va; G 2D : j(a(x)) ~3 x and \/y G Da : a(j(y)) = y. In general |Z is 
induced by C and a. Similarly, the operations of least upper bound (U) and 
greatest lower bound (l~l) mimic those of 2D in a precise sense. 
Algorithm 1 has been presented in [8] as a generic description of a fixed-
point algorithm which generalizes those used in state-of-the-art analysis en-
gines, such as the one in CiaoPP [7]. In order to analyze a program, traditional 
(goal dependent) abstract interpreters for (C)LP programs receive as input, 
in addition to the program P and the abstract domain Da, a set Sa G AAtom 
of Abstract Atoms (or cali patterns). Such cali patterns are pairs of the form 
A : CP where A is a procedure descriptor and CP is an abstract substitution 
(i.e., a condition of the run-time bindings) of A expressed as CP G Da. For 
brevity, we sometimes omit the subscript a in the algorithms. The analyzer of 
Algorithm 1 constructs an and-or graph [5] (or analysis graph) for Sa which 
is an abstraction of the (possibly infinite) set of (possibly infinite) execution 
paths (and-or trees) explored by the concrete execution of the initial calis de-
scribed by Sa in P. The program analysis graph is implicitly represented in 
the algorithm by means of two global data structures, the answer table and 
Algorithm 1 Generic Analyzer for Abstraction-Carrying Code 
function ANALYZE_F(5, ti) 
for A : CP € S do 
add-.ever\t(newcall(A : CP),ti) 
while E := next_event(fi) do 
if E := newcall(A : CP) t hen new_call_pattern(A : CP,ti) 
else if E := updated(A : CP) t hen add_dependent_rules(A : CP,ti) 
else if E := arc(R) t hen process_arc(P, ti) 
r e tu rn answer table 
procedure NEW_CALL_PATTERN(A : CP, ti) 
for all rule Ak : -Bk¡1,...,Bk¡„k do 
CP0 :=Aextend(CP,vars( . . . ,PM , . . . ) ) ; CPX := Arestr¡ct(CP0, v a r s ( P M ) ) 
add_event(arc(Ak : CP =¿> [CP0] Bk¿ : CPi),fi) 
add A : CP i—> ± to answer table 
procedure PROCESS_ARC(iífc : CP0 => [CP-i] Bk¡i : CP2,ti) 
if Bk¡i is not a constraint t hen 
add Hk : CPo =>• [CpJ B^j : CP2 to dependency are table 
W := vars(Hk,Bktl,...,Bktn'k); CP3 := get_answer(PM : CP2,CPuW,ti) 
if CP3 7^  ± and i ^ nk t hen 
CP4 := ArestNct(CP3,vars(Bfc)i+1)) 
add_event( arc(iífc : CP0 =¿> [CP3] Bfc,¿+1 : CP4),^) 
else if CP3 7^  A_ and i = nk t hen 
APi := Arestrict(CP3,vars(Hk)); ¡nsert_answer_¡nfo(ií : CP0 >->• APi,f2) 
function GET_ANSWER(L : CP2, CPi,W,ti) 
if L is a constraint t hen r e tu rn Aadd(L, CP{) 
else AP0 := lookup_answer(L : CP2,ti); APi := Aextend(AP0, W) 
r e tu rn Aglb(CPi,APi) 
function LOOKUP_ANSWER(A : CP, fi) 
if there exists a renaming <y s.t.<y(A : CP) 1—> AP in answer table t hen 
r e t u r n <7_1(A.P) 
else add_ever\t(newcaU(a(A : CP)),ti) where a is renaming s.t. a (A) in base form; 
r e tu rn ± 
procedure INSERT_ANSWER_INFO(ÍÍ : CP i-> AP, fi) 
AP0 := lookup_answer(ií : CP); APi := Alub(AP, AP0) 
if AP0 7^  APi t hen 
add (H : CP 1—> APi) to answer table 
add_ever\t(updated(H : CP),ti) 
procedure ADD_DEPENDENT_RULES(A : CP, ti) 
for all are of the form Hk : CPo =>• [CPi] Bk¡i : CP2 in graph where there exists 
renaming a s.t. A : CP = (Bk¡i : CP2)a do 
38: add.event(arc(iífc : CP0 =¿> [C^] P M : CP2),Ü) 
the dependency are table, both initially empty. 
• The answer table contains entries of the form A : CP 1—• ^4P where A is 
always a base form* and ^4P an abstract substitution. Its entries should be 
interpreted as "the answer pattern for calis to A satisfying precondition (or 
cali pattern) CP meets posteondition (or answer pattern), AP." 
1
 Program rules are assumed to be normalized: only distinct variables are allowed to oceur 
as arguments to atoms. Furthermore, we require that each rule deñning a predícate p has 
identical sequence of variables xpi,... xPn in the head atom, i.e., p(xpi,... xPn). We cali 
this the base form of p. 
• A dependency are is of the form Hk : GPQ =>- [CP\] Bk¡i : GP2- This is inter-
preted as follows: if the rule with Hk as head is called with description CP0 
then this causes the i-th literal Bki to be called with description CP2- The 
remaining part CP\ is the program annotation just before Bki is reached 
and contains information about all variables in rule k. 
Intuitively, the analysis algorithm is a graph traversal algorithm which places 
entries in the answer table and dependency are table as new nodes and ares in 
the program analysis graph are encountered. To capture the difierent graph 
traversal strategies used in different fixed-point algorithms, a priorüized event 
queue is used. We use O G QHS to refer to a Queue Handling Strategy 
which a particular instance of the generic algorithm may use. Different QHS 
may traverse the analysis graph in a depth-first, breadth-first fashion or any 
combination (see, e.g., [15] for different strategies). Events are of three forms: 
nevjcall(A : CP) which indicates that a new cali pattern for literal A with 
description CP has been encountered. 
arc(Hk : _ =>- [_] Bk¡i : _) which indicates that the rule k with H as head needs 
to be (re)computed from the position k, i. 
updated(A : CP) which indicates that the answer description to cali pattern 
A with description CP has been changed. 
The functions adcLevent and next.event respectively push an event to the prior-
ity queue and pop the event of highest priority, according to O. The algorithm 
is defined in terms of five abstract operations on the domain Da: 
Arestrict( CP, V) performs the abstract restriction of a description CP to the 
set of variables in the set V, denoted vars(V); 
Aextend (CP, V) extends the description CP to the variables in the set V; 
Aglb(CPi, GP2) performs the abstract conjunction of two descriptions; 
Aadd(C, CP) performs the abstract operation of conjoining (i.e., computing 
the conjunction) the abstraction of the constraint C with the description CP; 
Alub(CPi, CP2) performs the abstract disjunction of two descriptions. 
More details on the algorithm can be found in [8,15]. Let us briefly explain its 
main procedures. The algorithm centers around the processing of events on 
the priority queue, which repeatedly removes the highest priority event (Line 
4) and calis the appropriate event-handling function (L5-7). The function 
new_call_pattern initiates processing of all the rules for the definition of the 
infernal literal A, by adding are events for each of the first literals of these 
rules (L12). Initially, the answer for the cali pattern is set to ± (L13). The 
procedure process_arc performs the core of the analysis. It performs a single 
step of the left-to-right traversal of a rule body. If the literal Bki is not a 
constraint (L15), the are is added to the dependency are table (L16). Atoms 
are processed by function get_answer. Constraints are simply added to the 
current description (L24). In the case of literals, the function lookup_answer 
first looks up an answer for the given cali pattern in the answer table (L28) 
and if it is not found, it places a newcall event (L30). When it finds one, then 
this answer is extended to the variables in the rule the literal occurs in (L25) 
and conjoined (i.e., the conjunction of both descriptions is computed) with 
the current description (L26). The resulting answer (L17) is either used to 
genérate a new are event to process the next literal in the rule, if Bk,% is not the 
last one (L18); otherwise, the new answer is computed by insert_answer_info. 
This is the part of the algorithm more relevant to the generation of reduced 
certificates. The new answer for the rule is combined with the current answer 
in the table (L32). If the fixpoint for such cali has not been reached, then 
the answer table entry is updated with the combined answer (L34) and an 
updated event is added to the queue (L35). The purpose of such an update is 
that the function add_dependent_rules (re)processes those calis which depend 
on the cali pattern A : CP whose answer has been updated (L37). This efFect is 
achieved by adding the are events for each of its dependencies (L38). Note that 
dependeney ares are used for efficieney: they allow us to start the reprocessing 
of a rule from the body atom which actually needs to be recomputed due to 
an update rather than from the leftmost atom. 
The following defmition corresponds to the certification process carried 
out by the producer. First, an abstraction (written Certa) is automatically 
generated which safely approximates the behaviour of the program by using 
a static analyzer. And, second, the verification condition is generated from 
this certifícate and it can be proved only if the execution of the code does not 
viólate the safety policy. In particular, we use an abstract safety policy Ia G 
AInt in order to specify precisely the (abstract) conditions under which the 
execution of a program is considered safe. Then, the certifier checks whether 
the abstraction entails the safety policy, i.e., Certa E 1a-
Definition 2.1 We define function CERTiFiER_F:Pro<jf x ADom xAAtom x 
AInt x QHS i—• ACert which takes a program P G Prog, Da G ADom, Sa G 
AAtom, la G AInt, O G QHS and returns as full certifícate, FCert G ACert, 
the answer table computed by ANALYZE_F(5'Q,, O) for P in Da if FCert |Z Ia. 
3 Reduced Certificates 
The key observation in order to reduce the size of certificates is that certain 
enfries in a certifícate may be irrelevant, in the sense that the checker is 
able to reproduce them by itself in a single pass. The notion of relevance is 
directly related to the idea of recomputation in the program analysis graph. 
Intuitively, given an entry in the answer table A : CP i—• AP, its fixpoint may 
have been computed in several iterations from ±, APQ, AP\,... until AP. For 
each change in the answer, an event updated (A : CP) is generated during the 
analysis. The above entry is relevant in a certifícate (under some strategy) 
when its updates forcé the recomputation of other ares in the graph which 
depend on A : CP (i.e., there is a dependeney from it in the table). Thus, 
unless A : CP i—• ^4P is included in the (reduced) certifícate, a single-pass 
checker which uses the same strategy as the code producer will not be able to 
validate the certifícate. 
3.1 The Notion of Reduced Certifícate 
According to the above intuition, we are interested in determining when an 
entry in the answer table has been "updated" during the analysis and such 
changes affect other entries. However, there are two special types of updated 
events which can be considered "irrelevant". The first one is called a redun-
dant update and corresponds to the kind of updates which forcé a redun-
dant computation. We write DAT\A-.CP to denote the set of ares of the form 
H : CPo =>- [CPAB : GP^ in the current dependeney are table such that they 
depend on A : CP with A : CP = (B : CP%)o for some renaming a. 
Definition 3.1 Let P G Prog, Sa G AAtom and O G QHS. We say that an 
event updated (A : CP) which appears in the event queue during the analysis 
of P for Sa is redundant w.r.t. O if, when it is generated, DAT\A-.CP = 0-
The second type of updates which can be considered irrelevant are initial 
updates which, under certain circumstances, are generated in the first pass 
over an are. In particular, we do not take into account updated events which 
are generated when the answer table contains A. for the updated entry. Note 
that this case still corresponds to the first traversal of any are and should not 
be considered as a reprocessing. 
Definition 3.2 In the conditions of Def. 3.1, we say that an event updated(A : 
CP) which appears in the event queue during the analysis of P for Sa is initial 
for O if, when it is generated, the answer table contains A : CP i—• ± . 
Initial updates do not oceur in certain very optimized algorithms, like the one 
in [15]. However, they are necessary in order to model generic graph traversal 
strategies. In particular, they are intended to resume ares whose evaluation 
has been suspended. 
Definition 3.3 In the conditions of Def. 3.1, we say that an event updated^ : 
CP) is relevant iff it is not initial ñor redundant. 
The key idea is that those answer patterns whose computation has introduced 
relevant updates should be available in the certifícate. 
Definition 3.4 In the conditions of Def. 3.1 we say that the entry A : CP i—• 
AP in the answer table is relevant for O iff there has been at least one relevant 
event updated(A : CP) during the analysis of P for Sa. 
Reduced certificates allow us to remove irrelevant entries from the answer table 
and produce a smaller certifícate which can still be validated in one pass. 
Definition 3.5 In the conditions of Def. 3.1, let FCert= ANALYZE_F(5'Q,, O) for 
P and Sa- We define the reduced certifícate, RCert, as the set of relevant 
entries in FCert for O. 
3.2 Generation of Certificates wühout Irrelevant Entries 
In this section, we proceed to instrument the analyzer of Algorithm 1 with the 
extensions necessary for producing reduced certificates, as defined in Def. 3.5. 
The resulting analyzer ANALYZE_R is presented in Algorithm 2. It uses the same 
procedures of Algorithm 1 except for the new definitions of add_dependent_rules 
and insert_answer_info. The differences with respect to the original definition 
are: 
(i) We count the number of relevant updates for each cali pattern. To do 
this, we associate with each entry in the answer table a new field "w" whose 
purpose is to identify relevant entries. Concretely, u indicates the number of 
updated events processed for the entry. u is initialized when the (unique and 
first) initial updated event occurs for a cali pattern. The initialization of u 
is different for redundant and initial updates as explained in the next point. 
When the analysis finishes, if u > 1, we know that at least one reprocessing 
has occurred and the entry is thus relevant. The essential point to note is that 
u has to be increased when the event is actually extracted from the queue (L3) 
and not when it is introduced in it (L13). The reason for this is that when 
a non-redundant, updated event is introduced, if the priority queue contains 
an identical event, then the processing is performed only once. Therefore, our 
counter must not be increased. 
(ii) We do not genérate redundant updates. Our algorithm does not introduce 
redundant updated events (L13). However, if they are initial (and redundant) 
they have to be counted as if they had been introduced and processed and, 
thus, the next update over them has to be considered always relevant. This 
effect is achieved by initializing the u-valué with a higher valué ("1" in L l l ) 
than for initial updates ("0" in LIO). Indeed, the valué "0" just indicates 
that the initial updated event has been introduced in the priority queue but 
not yet processed. It will be increased to " 1 " once it is extracted from the 
queue. Therefore, in both cases the next updated event over the cali pattern 
will increase the counter to "2" and will be relevant. 
In Algorithm 2, a cali (u, AP)=get_from_answer_table(74 : CP) looks up in the 
answer table the entry for A : CP and returns its w-value and its answer AP. 
A cali set_in_answer_table(74(ií) : CP i—• AP) replaces the entry for A : CP with 
the new one A(u) : CP i—• AP .Note that, except for the control of relevant 
entries, ANALYZE_F(5'Q,, O) and ANALYZE_R(5'Q,, O) have the same behavior and 
they compute the same answer table (see [1] for details). We use function 
remove_irrelevant_answers which takes a set of answers of the form A(u) : CP i—• 
AP G FCert and returns the set of answers A : CP i—• AP such that u > 1. 
Def ini t ion 3.6 We define the function CERTIFIER_R: Prog x ADom x AA-
tom x AInt x QHS i-> ACert, which takes P G Prog, Da G ADom, Sa G AA-
tom, Ia G AInt, O G QHS. It returns as certifícate, RCert=remove_irrelevant-
_answers(FCert), where FCert=ANALYZE_R(5,a, O), if FCert jZ Ia. 
Algori thm 2 ANALYZE_R: Analyzer instrumented for Certifícate Reduction 
1: procedure ADD_DEPENDENT_RULES(A : CP,ií) 
2: (AP,u) =get_from_answer_table(A : CP) 
3: set_in_answer_table(A(M + 1) : CP i-> AP) 
4: for all are of the form Hk : CPQ =>• \CP\\ Bk,i : CP2 in graph where there exists 
renaming a s.t. A : CP = (Bk¿ '• CP?)<J do 
5: add.event(arc(iífc : CP0 =¿> [CP{\ Bk¿ : CP2),fí) 
6: procedure lNSERT_ANSWER_lNFO(ií : CP >->• AP, fi) 
7: AP0 := lookup_answer(ií : CP,Ú) ; APi := A\ub(AP, AP0) 
8: if AP0 ^ APi t hen % updated required 
9: if AP0 = ± t hen 
10: if DAT\[J:CP =/= 0 then U = 0 % non redundant initial update 
11: else u=\ % redundant initial update 
12: else (u, _)=get_from_answer_table(ií : CP) % not initial update 
13: if DAT\H:CP ^ 0 then add.event(updated(ií : CP)) 
14: set_in_answer_table(ií(M) : CP i-> APi) 
We have demonstrated in [1] that a checking algorithm which uses the same 
QHS is able to reconstruct the full certifícate from the reduced certifícate in a 
single pass over the full abstraction. Our completeness results also ensure that 
all reduced certificates validated by the checker are indeed valid, regardless of 
the QHS upon which the checker is based. 
4 Discussion 
As we have pointed out throughout the paper, the gain of the reduction is 
directly related to the number of wpdates (or iterations) performed during 
analysis. Clearly, depending on the graph traversal strategy used, different 
instances of the generic analyzer will genérate reduced certificates of different 
sizes. Significant and successful efforts have been made during recent years 
towards improving the efficieney of analysis. The most optimized analyzers 
actually aim at reducing the number of updates necessary to reach the fi-
nal fixpoint [15]. Interestingly, our framework greatly benefits from all these 
advances, since the more eflicient analysis is, the smaller the corresponding 
reduced certificates are. We have implemented a generator and a checker of re-
duced certificates in CiaoPP. Both the analysis and checker use the optimized 
depth-first new-calling QHS of [15]. In our experimental evaluation (see [2] 
for details) we have observed reductions in the size of certificates by a factor 
of over 3 on average using our reduced certificates across a set of benchmarks, 
with a very small variation in checking time (within 6% on average). 
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